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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries arising out
of an alleged professional medical malpractice committed upon
plaintiff, Ralph Conk by the defendant, Dr. Wallace Chambers,
during the course of their professional relationship.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury.

From a verdict and

judgment for the defendant, and the trial court's failure to
grant plaintiff's Motion for New Trial, plaintiff appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the judgment and
judgment in his favor as a matter of law as to defendant's
negligence with the case remanded for a trial on the issues
of causation and damages only, or that failing, a new trial
on all issues.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Ralph Conk, plaintiff herein, was a patient of
defendant Dr. Wallace Chambers, a board certified general surgeon
at the Granger Medical Clinic.

(R. 162-165)

He had been treated

by various doctors at the clinic over the years for various
minor maladies, but primarily for high blood pressure and
obesity.

(See testimony of Drs. Lavere D. Poulsen and Jerry

K. Poulsen.

R. 1104-1141)

Because of those continuing

problems, plaintiff first went to Dr. Chambers on March 28, 1973,
requesting surgical help and advice.

The doctor recommended

that Mr. Conk undergo an operative procedure wherein certain
portions of his small intestine would be bypassed to decrease
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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its absorptive capabilities thereby effecutating substantia;
weight reduction.

(R, 780-783) •

That operation was performea

on Mr. Conk at the Valley West Hospital on April 23, 1973.
(R. 800)
According to the defendant, Mr. Conk "had an excel!
operative and post-operative course"

(R. 1173.)

Also accorc.

to the doctor, up to February 17, 1975, they had achieved
the "results contemplated or hoped for, at least, by the

sm~

(R. 1160)
However, again by the testimony of the defendant,
by March 1975, a significant change in Mr. conk's kidney
function was noted.

(R. 1169-1170)

At that time Dr. Chambt:

patient was referred to other specialists who followed his
condition.

Ultimately his kidneys completely shut down.

(R. 1171, 1010-1015)
Since the time of the total kidney failure in 1915,
Mr. Conk has had one unsuccessful attempt at a kidney transpL
He has been put to the necessity of being attached to an
artificial kidney machine three times per week for periods
of five hours for each session.

He has had many assorted

physicial difficulties directly associated with the loss ~
his kidneys.

He can no longer be gainfully employed and is

currently on a disability retirement from his job as a draft:·
for the U.S. Government.

(R. 1016-1026)

It was the position of plaintiff at trial that t~
· · ster"•
medical treatment by Dr. Chambers was negligently a d mini
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More particularly, plaintiff alleged that the doctor was
negligent in that he knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care
he should have known that the performance of the ileal bypass
involved

extraordinary, unusual and medically unacceptable

risks to his patient's health and well-being.

Specifically,

the doctor failed and neglected to advise plaintiff of the nature
and seriousness of the risks associated with the operation,
that the plaintiff had a pre-existing kidney condition that
would contraindicate performance of the operation, and that
the operation itself was experimental in nature.

Therefore,

the doctor did not obtain the requisite informed consent for
the performance of the operation.
Plaintiff further asserted that the operation
should never have been performed because Mr. Conk was not a
proper candidate due to his prior kidney damage of which
Mr. Conk had no knowledge.

It was also alleged that the

follow-up care and treatment 'administered by the defendant was
substandard in that necessary tests were not conducted and
adequate monitoring of plaintiff's condition, which was not
done, would have revealed the deteriorating kidneys at a time
when their function could have been saved or at least the
damage minimized.

(Citation of the facts and reference to the

record concerning the above is made where appropriate
Arguments that follow the Statement of Facts)
At the conclusion of the evidence, plaintiff
motions for directed verdict on
statute of limitations and lack of informed consent.

Bo
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of the motions were denied.

(R.

1369-1374).

The trial court submitted the case to the jury
by instructing them on the above two issues as well as "conunur.i
standard of care."

Following an adverse jury verdict and

judgment, plaintiff filed his Motion For New Trial (R. 18Hi:
and Memorandum In Support Of Motion For New Trial

(R. 196-li

which motion was denied.
This appeal is taken because the trial court commit•'
prejudicial error in not granting plaintiff's motions for
directed verdict, in erroneously instructing the jury, and
in failing to grant plaintiff's Motion For New Trial.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN PRESENTING ITS INSTRUCTIONS
24 AND 25 TO THE JURY AS THEY DO NOT REFLECT THE PROPER
STANDARD AS TO THE LIMITATION OF ACTIONS THAT APPLIES TO
A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE.
For the convenience of the Court we set forth
hereunder the trial Court's Instructions 24 and 25 (R.163 and
164) .

INSTRUCTION NO. 24
As an affirmative defense, defendants contend this
action is barred by the statute of limitations.
Defendants have the burden of proving this defense by
a preponderance of the evidence.
The statute of limitations requires that any action
brought against a physician for an injury must be
commenced within two years after the date of the
injury or two years after the patient discovers,
or through the exercise of reasonable diligence,
should have discovered the injury, whichever occurs
later. You must determine from the evidence when
the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered
his injury.
If the plaintiff became aware of facts that, under
the circumstances, would have alerted an ordinary
and prudent person to the possibility that some
unexpected harm may have been caused by the surgery,
then he is also deemed to have discovered the
injury on that date.
The plaintiff is charged with
the responsibility of making inquiries upon learning
of the possibility of harm and he is deemed to know
everything that such an inquiry might have revealed
concerning the injury and the cause of such injury.
INSTRUCTION NO. 25
For purposes of applying the statute of limitations,
the plaintiff is deemed to have discovered his injury
when he first became aware of any unexpected and
harmful consequences that he knew, or upon reasonable
inquiry should have known, were caused by the surgery
Dr. Chambers performed.
It is not required that
the plaintiff was able to ascertain or comprehend
the full extent or nature of his injury at that time,
nor is it necessary that he knew, or could have known,
that the injury was caused by negligence of Dr. Chambers
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It is sufficient if plaintiff knew, or by the use of
reasonable diligence could have learned, that the
injury was the result of the surgery.
With these principles to guide you, if you find fro
a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff r.
discovered or through the use of reasonable diligen~;'
should have discovered any injury before July 29, ·
1974, then you must return a verdict in favor of
the defendants.
Plaintiff first made a motion for a directed
verdict as to the statute of limitations at the conclusion
of the evidence and then took exception to the legal
expressed in the trial court's instructions at the
time during the trial (R.1338 and 1339).

stand~&

appropria~

Plaintiff further

brought these matters to the attention of the trial court in
his Motion for New Trial and in his Memorandum in Support of
Motion for New Trial (R.200

202).

A.
HISTORY OF LIMITATION OF ACTIONS STATUTES IN
CASES OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE.
Medical malpractice cases at common law were
classified in the general category of negligence or tort
actions.

Therefore, until special legislation began

being~~

in various jurisdictions throughout the country, the general
negligence limitation of action statutes applied.

Utah's

general statute found in Section 78-12-1 U.C.A., 1953, which
is similar to most such sections throughout the country, state;
in pertinent part:
"Civil actions can be commenced only within
periods prescribed in this chapter, after the
cause of action shall have accrued, .
·
t e d the "accrual'
The common law rule harshly interpre
date as being the moment of the defendant's neglect.

~
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,,,,,,,,,,

v. Crowell, 247 S.E.2d 287 (N.C. 1978) at 293.
In the 1930's exceptions to the common law limitation
began surfacing to ameliorate the inequities of such a harsh
rule.

The first exception that gained popular acceptance is

known as the "continued course of treatment rule."

The

theory is basically that a Fiduciary relationship of trust
exists between a patient and doctor which if broken could result
in more serious consequences than the act of malpractice itself
may cause.

An illustrative case is that of Borgia v.

of New York, 187 N.E.2d 777 (N.Y. 1962).

City

At 187 N.E.2d

779 the court explained the principle of continuing treatment
tolling the statute of limitations by placing the theory in the
context of the facts of the case that was before the court.
Little argument is needed to prove the proposition
that the "continuous treatment" therory is the
fairer one.
It would be absurd to require a
wronged patient to interrupt corrective efforts
by serving a summons on the physician or hospital
superintendent or by filing a notice of claim in
the case of a city hospital. The case now under
review will illustrate.
This child by reason of
the hospital personnel's negligence suffered
permanent brain damage at the hospital on the
night he was admitted and on three later
occasions was a victim of neglect amounting to
malpractice. Acceptance by us of the city's
argument that the 90 days ran from the last mal~
practice would mean that, if the child had :emained
in the hospital a few days longer than he did, t~e
90-day period would have expired while he was still
a patient receiving care and treatm~nt related to
the conditions produced by the earlier wrongful
acts and omissions of defendant's employees.
we are warned of dire results from this holding.
Patients, we are told, will use this decis~on to
justify suits brought years later. But this
assumes that, so long as a patient c?ntinue~ to
consult the same physician for any kind of illness,
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the time to sue as to any kind of malpractice will
never start to run.
We are creating no such
situation.
The "continuous treatment" we mean is
treatment for the same or related illnesses or
injuries, continuing after the alleged
acts of malpractice, not mere continuity of a
general physician-patient relationship.
The Utah Supreme Court very early in the trend

t~~

liberializing the severity of the common law rule adopted a
continuing course of treatment rule.

In the case of Peteler

v. Robison, 17 P. 2d 244 (Utah 1932), defendant was an eye, ear
nose, and throat specialist who allegedly performed an
unnecessary tonsilectomy, and gave improper follow-up
care and treatment which resulted in severe infection which
spread to both ears requiring surgical care and

tr~atment.

~

plaintiff was under the care and treatment of the doctor
seeing him on a regular basis from January 16, 1919,
to and including October 22, 1926.

The defendant

demurredw~

the trial court sustaining the demurrer on the ground that
the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitatiom
for failure to file within four years after the cause of
action accrued.

The action was filed January 24, 1927.

Defendant took the position the cause accrued January 18,
1919 when the alleged misdiagnosis took place.
The Court explained its reversal of the trial court
in the following language:
Had we a case where the only negligence alledged
was the negligent and unskillful operation i~
removing the tonsils, and nothing more, let it
be assumed that the cause of action accrued at
the time of the commission and completion of such
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operation, and, if an action based on such negligence
alone was not commenced within four years thereafter, the bar of the.statute would be complete,
though the consequential damages or injuries
resulting from such negligence were not ascertained
or made manifest until after the statute had run.
But that is not the alleged cause of action.
Here the defendant undertook to treat the plaintiff
for a throat affliction. From the time he undertook
to treat the case until he ceased to treat it he,
as alleged, did so in a negligent and unskillful
manner.
As alleged, the treatments were not
separate and distinct acts, separate and distinct
causes of action.
They constituted an entire
course of treatment of a case undertaken by
defendant to be treated by him, and the whole
thereof constituted but one cause of action.
From the averments of the complaint, we think it
should here be said, that the tort was a
continuing one, and, where the tort is continuing,
the right of action is also continuing.
(17 P2d.
at 249) (Citations Omitted).
In addition to the continuing tort theory the Court
further discussed allegations of fraudulent concealment based
upon representations of the defenant that his care and treatment
would correct the problems in time and that she was suffering
from the natural consequences of the operation.

Defendant

countered that such representations were mere expressions of
opinion and not sufficient to show fraud.

The Court implied

that there is a different standard of fraud when the doctor
patient relationship exists not entirely unlike the later
decision in Ballenger, supra.
(T)he case is not one of an alleged tort
or breach where the parties stood on an equality and
dealt with each other at arm's length, or where
each had equal means of knowledge. The relation
of the parties being that of physician and patient,
the case is one of trust and confidence imposed
in the defendant, and, as to what was to be done and
what was being done and as to the manner ~f treatment,
the plaintiff had the right to rely and did rely
upon the superior knowledge of the defendant.
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The necessity, purpose, and good faith of the
continued treatments were facts peculiarly within
the knowledge of the defendant.
While the alleged
assurances of the defendant, that the continued
treatments would eventually clear up and cure the
throat conditions, were in the nature of an opini~
and for that reason not subject as a basis of an '
action for failure to accomplish such results, Still
the promises and assurances were pertinent and
relevant as bearing on the confidence and relian~
placed in the defendant, on the acts and conduct of
the plaintiff in submitting to the continued
treatments and as to her delay of enforcing wha~v~
right to a cause of action was possessed by her, ~,
if the defendant by his continued treatments was
able to accomplish what he represented and assured
he was able to do and the representations believed•
relied on by plaintiff, the natural effect of su~
representations until the falsity of them was
discovered was to cause delay in the enforcement
of whatever right was possessed by the plait~ff .
17 P2d at 250 (Emphasis Added).

(See Fowles v. Pennsylvania

Ry, 264 F2d 399 (1959) putting the continuing tort theory in
the context of a Federal Employers Liability Act case).
In the years that followed, many jurisdictions adopt1
the termination of treatment theory as the date of "accrual"
of the cause of action.
faced the issue
treatment"

A relatively early California case

of whether or not the "termiation of

theory was to apply in a situation where a specifi:

statute limited the cause of action.
P2d. 885 (Cal. 1954).

Myers v. Stevenson, 270

Therein, the Court was faced with

an alleged malpractice by a physician committed on a minor
during the course of the mother's labor.

The suit was filed

more than six years after the child's birth.

The Court was

asked to consider the applicability of California's six year
statute governing torts committed upon children conceived, but
not yet born.

The statute

specifically stated that there

would be no tolling of the six year limitation during any ~~·
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disability mentioned in another section of the code that
provided for tolling during periods of minority, insanity, and
other disabilities.

(It should be noted that this aspect is

very similar to our current malpractice limitation of Section
78-14-4 U.C.A., 1953 as amended, infra.)
The Court found that there would be a tolling of
the statute during the continuing treatment because the six
year limitation was procedural in natute just as limitation of
actions statutes are on any right that had its origin at common
law as opposed to having its origin in legislative enactment
and therefore:
If a statute specifies one exception to a general rule
* * *other exceptions * * *are excluded."
Having expressly provided that the disabilities
mentioned in Code Civ.Proc. § 352, i. e. infancy,
insanity, etc., shall not extend the statute the
legislature under this rule, as plainly indicated
that other recognized legal grounds for extending the
statute should be operative.
We conclude that the time limitation contained in
section 29 was intended by the legislature as a
procedural statute of limitations subject to being
extended by any legal ground not specificall.y
excluded in the section itself.
270 P2d. at 890 (Citations Omitted).

(Emphasis Added).

That, of course is the status of the medical malpractice limitation that currently exists in Utah in that it
has certain specifically excluded items leaving other legal
grounds subject to court determination.
The Myers case also was an early decision further
ameliorating the burden on plaintiffs by judicially invoking
the rule "that the statute of limitation only starts to run
from the date of discovery of, or the date when by the exercise
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of reasonable diligence the plaintiff should have discovered
the wrongful act."

270 P2d at 887.

The Court used the

"discovery rule" and the "termination of treatment rule"
together in reversing the judgment of the lower court.
The Utah Supreme Court was again confronted with
the definition of when a malpractice cause of action "accrues
in the case of Christiansen v. Rees, 436 P2d 435 (Utah 196s).
Again, it should be recalled this case predated the passage
of specific legislation limiting the period of time during
which a malpractice claim could be filed.

In the

Christi~~

case the evidence showed that a foreign object, to-wit:
a surgical needle, had been left in the body of the Plaintiff
an operation; that Plaintiff had been ignorant of that factt
ensuing period of time; that 10 years after the surgical proci!
had been performed, but within four years after Plaintiff

h~

discovered the existence of the surgical needle in his body,:,
tiff filed a malpractice action.
Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Trial Court granted ~~

On appeal the question was whet'

Utah would adopt the so-called "discovery rule" or whetherOO
would rule that regardless of the Plaintiff's lack of knowlec:
of the existence of the foreign object in his body, the St~~
of Limitations commenced to run at the time of perforrnanceo'
the operation.

In a four to one decision, Justice Callist~

made the following statement in support of the "discovery
rule":
Case authority is divided as to the proper
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rule in cases such as this.
It would serve no
useful purpose to discuss these divergent opinions.
Suffice it to sa , this court has read and
ana yze them an
as reac e t e cone usion that
logic and reason support those authorities which
have adopted the discover¥ rule. It seems somewhat incongruous that an injurea person must commence
a malpractice action prior to the time he knew, or
reasonably should have known, of his injur~ and
right of action.
It seems apparent that a herence to
the 'majority rule' would penalize the conscientious
doctor, who would advise his patient of a mistake,
and protect a practitioner, who would not reveal
his mistake until the statute of limitations became
a shield.
Therefore, we now hold that, regardless of
prior pronouncements, where a foreign object is
negligently left in the body of a patient during
an operation and the patient is ignorant of the
fact, and consequently of his right of action for
malpractice, the cause of action does not accrue
until the patient learned of the resence of such
oreign obJect in his bo y.
Emphasis ad e
The Court in arriving at its opinion cites with
approval a number of cases, some of which are of particular
importance.
The first of these cases is that of Berry v.
421 P.2d 966

(Ore. 1966).

Bran~,

In the Berry case the Plaintiff

brought a malpractice action against a physician.
Court entered judgment adverse to the patient.

The Trial

The patient

appealed and the Supreme Court in a five-two decision reversed,
holding that the cause of action for malpractice action "accrues"
within the meaning of the applicable two-year statute of limitations
when the patient obtains " • • • knowledge, or reasonably should
have obtained knowledge of a tort committed on the patient's

-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

person by the physician."

The facts of the case were that

Defendant, in performing a hysterectomy upon the Plaintiff,
had left a surgical needle in her abdomen and the

existen~

of the surgical needle in her abdomen was not discovered until
nine years later.

The cause of action was filed within two

years of the discovery.

The relevant statute reads as

follows:
"Actions at law shall only be commenced within
the period prescribed in this chapter, after
the cause of action shall have accrued,
(Emphasis added)
The Court, after noting that the "present ,controver:
revolves around the meaning of the word 'accrued', "had the
following to say in support of its opinion:
"To say that a cause of action accrues to a
person when she may maintain an action thereon
and, at the same time, that it accrues before
she has or can reasonably be expected to have
knowledge of any wrong inflicted upon her is
patently inconsistent and unrealistic. She cannot
maintain an action before she knows she has one.
To say to one who has been wrongea, ~you had a
remedy, but before the wrong was ascertainable
to you, the law stripped you of your remedy,
makes a mockery of the law.
In the absence of an
expressed statutory direction to the effect, to
ascribe to the legislature any such intention by
their use of the word 'accrue' seems to us
unreasonable."
And, again:
"We do not believe the legislature intended to
limit patients asserting malpractice claims, who
by the very nature of the treatment had no way
of immediately ascertaining their injury, to

-14-
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the same overall period of time that is allowed
~or b~inging other tort actions that are normally
immediately ascertainable upon commission of
the wrong. The protection of the medical profession from stale claims does not require such
a harsh rule."
And, finally, in support of its opinion, the Court states:
"It is the opinion of this court that the cause
of action accrued at the time plaintiff obtained
knowledge, or reasonably should have obtained
knowledge of the tort committed upon her person
by defendant.
The case of Vaughn v. Langmack is
overruled."
(Citations Omitted)
Another case cited with approval by the Utah Court in
the Christiansen case is Johnson v. St. Patrick's Hospital, et al.
417 P2d.

469 (Mont. 1966).

In the Johnson case, Plaintiff brought

an action against the doctor and hospital claiming he had recently
discovered that a sponge had been left in his body in an operation
perfonned ten years previously.

The Trial Court granted summary

judgment against the patient holding that the Statute of Limitations
had run against his claim.

The case was appealed and reversed.

The applicable Statut,e of Limitations reads as follows:
"Within three years:

•

"3.
An action upon an obligation or liability,
not founded upon an instrument
"
The question again was clearly presented as to whether
the Statute of Limitations commenced to run at the time of
the negligent incident or at the time plaintiff discovered
the negligent incident.

The Court in a very erudite

opinion covers various theories different jurisdictions have
promulgated to obviate the harshness of the so-called general
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•
rule that Statutes of Limi ta ti on run from commission of the
ligent act.

r,,

The Court discussed the "continuing negligence tr.'

the "contract theory," and the "fraudulent concealment theory'
and then the Court in summary had the following to say:
"All of these exceptions to the so-called
'general rule' which respondents want this
court to follow illustrate that in reality
the 'general rule' has little to recommend
it.
Courts out of necessity have tried to
make exceptions in order to do justice. We
confronted with the problem presented by the
facts of this case had adopted the best reasoned rule, which we adopt and will follow.
It is:
'Where a foreign object is negligently
left in a patient's body by a surgeon and the
patient is in ignorance of the fact, and, consequently of his right of action for malpractice, the cause of action does not accrue
until the patient learns of, or in exercise of
reasonable care and diligence should have
learned of the presence of such foreign object
in his body.' (Citations Omitted)
Another case cited by the Utah Court in Christianse:
to which we call the Court's attention is Billings v. Sisters
Mercy of Idaho, et al., 389 P.2d. 224 (Idaho 1964).

In

the~

case, Plaintiff brought an action for malpractice alleging

&

a gauze sponge had been left in her body during an operatioor
formed in 1948, which was not discovered until an
operation was performed in 1961.
years of discovery of the sponge.

explora~ey

The case was filed withinb
The applicable Statute of

Limitations reads as follows:
"Civil actions can only be commenced within
the periods prescribed in this chapter after the
cause of action shall have accrued, • .
"
The Trial Court dismissed the Complaint on the gro~
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that the cause of action was barred by the Statute of Limitations.
The case was appealed and reversed by the Idaho Supreme Court.
Defendant claimed that the cause of action accrued at the time
the sponge was left in her body.

Once again we have a Court

covering the entire Statute of Limitations problem as it pertains
to the "discovery" rule.

Discussing once again the "contract rule,"

the "continuing negligence rule," the "fraudulent concealment rule"
and so on, the Court states:
"Of course, when a plaintiff is run down by an
automobile, it is clear that his cause of action will
accrue on that date.
This is not only because he
has a right to sue, but also because he can use
judicial process to secure enforcement of that
right. Where a surgeon negligently leaves a ,
sponge in the body of a plaintiff, while the plaintiff might possess some potential right to sue, he
has no means of developing that right, or acting
upon it until he is able to discover the negligence
of the surgeon.
It is more logical to follow the
reasoning stated in Note, Developments in the
Law:
Statutes of Limitations, 63 Har.L.Rev. 1177 at
1205 (1950), as follows, '* * * the "cause of
action' which commences the limitations period
should not refer to the 'technical' breach of
duty which determines whether the plaintiff has
any legal right, but to the existence of a
practical remedy."
(Emphasis added)
And, again, the Court states:
"Indeed, it appears that most jurisdictions, when ,
faced with the set of facts we have presented herein
would, on one theory or another, allow appellants
to come into court and present their claims."
And in conclusion, the Court makes the statement which is quoted
with approval in Christiansen:
"In reality, the 'general rule' has little to
commend it.
It is neither the position of a
majority of the jurisdictions nor is,it ~irmly
based on consideraions of reason or Justice.
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We will, therfore, adhere to the following rule"
where a foreign object is negligently left in a
patient's body by a surgeon and the patient is in
ignorance of the fact, and consequently of his
right of action for malpractice, the cause of
action does not accrue until the patient learns
of, or in the exercise of reasonable care and
diligence should have learned of the presence
of such foreign object in his body. (Citations ~~~
Some argued the proposition that the "discovered,
or should by the exercise of reasonable care have discovered"
rule applied only to cases where foreign objects are left in
the bodies of persons during operative procedures and does
extend to other cases.

~

support~~

Such a contention was not

by the Christiansen case, by simple logic, or by authorities
from other states.

Again, we refer to the Christiansen langua·

"It seems somewhat incongruous that an injured
person must commence a malpractice action prior
to the time he knew, or reasonably should have
known, of his injury and right of action."
(Emphasis Added)
And then in a footnote, the Court quotes from the case of Ros"
v. Senger,

(1944)

149 P.2d 372:

"It is . . • an ancient maxim of the common law
that 'Where there is a right there is a remedy.'
What a mockery to say to one, grievously wronged,
'Certainly you had a remedy, but while your
debtor concealed from you the fact that you had
a right, the law stripped you of your remedy.'"
A case directly in point demonstrates "foreign body'
is only one aspect of the "discovery" doctrine.
dealt with a misdiagnosis.

That case

In the case of Yoshizaki v.

Hilo Hospital, 433 P2d. 220 (Hawaii 1967) plaintiff filed a
medical malpractice action.

The question was whether the

"discovery doctrine" should be applied or whether the har~
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doctrine that the Statute of Limitations began to run at the
time of the negligent act should be applied.

Plaintiff had alleged

that Defendant hospital, through one of its doctors, negligently
diagnosed the plaintiff's neck ailment as cancer.

The doctor

recommended radiation treatment of the "cancer".

The plaintiff

was treated at another hospital where, as a result of negligence
by an employee of the other hospital,

radiation burns.

the plaintiff received

The narrow question upon which the case turned,

as stated by the Court, was as follows:
"IVhen does the statute of limitation begin to run
against a malpractice claim where the plaintiff
did not know, nor acting reasonably could have been
expected to know, that the defendant had negligently
diagnosed an ailment?"
The claim was made in Yoshizaki that the "discovery"
rule should be limited to foreign object cases and should
not apply to a

broad~r

range of cases.

The Court stated:

"We conclude that the statute does not begain
to run until the plaintiff knew or should have
known of the defendant's negligence. This conclusion is consistent with the legislative prescription to avoid constructions which would lead
to absurd results.
The injustice of barring the
plaintiff's action before she could reasonably
have been aware that she had a claim is patent.
A basic reason underlying statutes of limitation
is nonexistent; the plaintiff has not delayed
voluntarily in asserting her claim. We realize
that added burdens are placed on defendants by
forcing them to defend claims with evidence that
may be stale. We should not overlook the fact that
the plaintiff must produce evidence sufficient
to establish a prima facie case before the
defendant is obliged to produce any evidence.
A few courts appear to have limited the discovery doctrine to cases in which the de~en~ant
has left a foreign object inside the plaintiff
in order to reduce the possibility that the
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plaintiff is asserting a completely fraudulent
claim.
(cases cited)
We reject the distinction.
In some cases, especially those involving an
allegedly negligent diagnosis, a physical object
is not involved proof becomes more difficult.
This does not necessarily mean that a fraudulent
claim may be more easily asserted. As in the
instant case, treatment generally follows diagnosis.
The treatment is an objective fact which
may be proved or disproved by people other than
the plaintiff.
The fact that the treatment is
the kind normally administered for the ailment the
doctor allegedly improperly diagnosed is strong
evidence of the diagnosis.
We concluded that the conflicting policies are
best reconciled by permitting the plaintiff the
opportunity to prove that she neither knew nor
could reasonably have been expected to know of the
defendant's alleged negligence until the date
alleged in her complaint.
If the legislature
deems our reconcilliation of these conflicting
policies incorrect or wishes to place an outside
limit on the time for bringing a malpractice
action, it is free to do so.
Until that time,
however, we will not deny a plaintiff access
to our courts for failure to assert such a
claim if he asserts it within two years after
he actually or constructively discovered it."
A later Idaho case applied the rule of law expres~
in Billings, supra, to a misdiagnosis case.
Edwards, 475 P2d. 530,

(Ida. 1979).

We cite

Renner~

The Renner case in-

volved a misdiagnosis which resulted in Colostomy surgery bei:
performed on March 21, 1961.

For three years thereafter Plai:

suffered other problems including pain and inability to cooW
normal body functions.

On July 15, 1964, corrective surgery''

performed revealing the misdiagnosis and a suit was filed wit:two years of the discovery of said misdiagnosis.

The Court~

in favor of Plaintiff and stated:
"It would, in our opinion, be manifestly
,
unjust to bar the enforcement of injury claims
brought by a plaintiff who was not, nor co~ld n~
have known that he was the victim of tortious
'
conduct
because
harm
was unknowa ble
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within two years of the negligent act. In this
age o~ enlightened medicine and highly sophisticated
curative treatment, it is very likely that the
maturation of injury resulting from negligent treatment would not evidence itself for well after the
tw? years provided for in the statute of limitations.
This thought becomes particularly disturbing when
one realizes that the latent injuries arising from
medical malpractice would very likely go undetected by
the victim as only trained and skillful practitioners
of medicine could ascertain whether a patient has
been mistreated. Even the physical symptoms which
might herald future inquiry may well be beyond the
comprehension or perception of the average layman."
Later, on the same page, the Court continues:
"To require a man to seek a remedy before he knows
of his rights is probably unjust. Under such circumstances, in order for a patient to secure and protect his legal rights against doctors for malpractice,
the patient would be required to submit himself to
complete examinations by a series of independent physicians after every operation or treatment he received
from the physician of his first choice. The unreasonableness of such a result is self-evident."
(Emphasis added)
See also for a 9th Circuit Court of Appeals interpretation of Idaho law suppcirting the "Discovery" rule in a
negligent diagnosis situation the case of Owens v. White,
et al.

(9 CCA 1965) 342 F2d. 817.
Another negligent diagnosis case is Hungerford v. U.S.

(9 CCA 1962) 307 F2d. 99.
Claims Act case.

The Hungerford case is a Federal Tort

A soldier wounded in July, 1950, in Korea was

misdiagnosed as having a psychosomatic condition, when, in fact, he

1.11

was suffering from organic brain damage which was correctable by

i 'i!

surgery.

Ii i

later.

The organic brain damage was not discovered until ten years
The action was thereafter filed against the Government.

Government claimed the Statute of Limitation had run.

The Court

The 11;

stat~!ti
1il
,11
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"
. . The Government had not only the duty to
communicate to Hungerford a correct diagnosis
of his condition, but also to render proper care
for the treatment of the physical condition from
w~ich he was actual~y suffering.
Under the allegations of the Complaint there was a failure to perfur
this latter duty because of the negligent manner in
which the examination and diagnostic tests were
made, or because of the failure to make tests, whlct
in the exercise of proper care should have been made.
With regard to the "discovery rule", see also:
Tomlinson v. Siehl, 459 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1970); Hackworth v.
Hart, 474 S.W.2d 377 (Ky. 1971); Layton v. Allen, 246 A.2d
794 (Del. 1968); Hundley v. St. Francis Hospital, 161

Cal.~~

800, 327 P.2d 131 (1958); Johnson v. Caldwell, 371 Mich. 368,
123 N.W.2d 785 (1963); Edwards v. Ford, 279 So.2d 851 (Fla. B';
Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1972); Mayer v. Good Samari:
Hospital, 14 Ariz.App. 248, 482 P.2d 497 (1971); Owens v.
Brechner, 172 Colo. 525, 474 P.2d 603 (1970); Lipsey v.
Michael Reese Hospital, 46 Ill.2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450 (1970):
Ruth v. Dight, 183 Neb. 866, 165 N.W.2d 74 (1969); Wilkinson
v. Harrington, 104 R.I.224, 243 A.2d 745 (1968); Iverson v.
Lancaster, 158 N.W.2d 507 (N.D. 1968); Springer v. Aetna
Casualty and Surety Co., 169 So.2d 171 (La.App. 1964);
Seitz v. Jones, 370 P.2d 300 (Okl. 1962); Nowell v. Hamiltoo,
249 N.C. 523, 107 S.E.2d 112 (1959); Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J.
267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973); Frohs v. Greene, 253 Or. 1
452 P.2d 564 (1969); Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137, 215
A.2d 825 (1966); Flanagan v. Mount Eden General Hospital, 24
N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871 (1969); Hungerford, supra;~
United States, 438 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1971); Johnson v.
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United States, 271 F.Supp. 205 (W.D. Ark. 1967); and Quinton
v. United States, 304 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1962).
In 1971 the Utah Statute of limitations was amended
by adding thereto Section 78-12-28 Utah Code Annotated, 1953

(1975 Pocket Supplement).

This section, for the first time

in Utah codified the "discovery" rule.

For convenience of

the Court we refer to the old general statute, and the subsequent amendments to it.

The key language reads as follows:

"78-12-1. Time for commencement of actions
generally.--Civil actions can be commenced only
within the periods prescribed in this chapter,
after the cause of action shall have accrued, •
(Emphasis added)
The 1971 statute reads in pertinent part:
78-12-28. Within two years: . • .
(3)
An action against a physician and surgeon,
. . • or a licensed hospital • • . for professional
negligence . . • two years after the date of injury
or two years after the plaintiff discovers, or
throught the use'of reasonable diligence, should
have discovered the injury, whichever occurs
later, . . . " (Emphasis added)
The 1976 Legislature made additional changes in the
limitation of action section of the:"Health Care Malpractice
Act".

Section 78-14-1 et. seq, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

Again, in pertinent part that section

states:

78-14-4.
Statute of limitations--Exceptions-Application. -- (l) No malpractice action against
a health care provider may be brought unless it
is commenced within two years after the plaintiff
or patient discovers, or through the use of rea~
sonable diligence should have discovered the in]ury,
whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four
years after the date of the alleged act, omission,
neglect or occurrence, • • .

-23-
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It can readily be seen from that language that the
"discovery" rule pronounced so clearly in Christiansen has
been reaffirmed by the new statutes.

The difference between

the 1971 and the 1976 statutes is minimal.
of "discovery

The key language

of the injury" is the same.

B.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
INSTRUCTING THE JURY IN INSTRUCTION 25 " . . . NOR IS IT
NECESSARY THAT HE KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT THE INJURY
WAS CAUSED BY NEGLIGENCE OF DR. CHAMBERS
"
With the history of statute of limitations in
medical malpractice actions in mind, it is now
to the specifics of the case at bar.
25 (R.164) misstates the law.

appropriate~;

The court's instructioo

The standard the Trial Court

presented the jury would require an injured patient to file
his cause of action before he has a resonable opportunity

~

discover the necessary elements of a prima facie cause of acti:
The elements of a prima facie cause of action are physical
injury plus some act of neglect proximately causing physical
injury.

Instruction 25 would require an individual to file

a cause of action every time an operation or any medical
treatment didn't result in a complete recovery whether due
to the neglect of his physician or not.

This would result

in a great multiplicity of meritless lawsuits which is
contrary to public policy.
It is advisable that the definition of "injury" ~
examined.

It is axiomatic that in determining legislative

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-24-

intent the words in a statute must be interpreted in the light
of their common meaning.

"Injury" is defined in the College

Edition, Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language,
World Publishing Company, Cleveland and New York, 1960, as follows:
"1.
physical harm or damage to a person,
property, etc.
2.
unjust treatment; violation
or rights; offense."
(Emphasis added)

An amplification of that definition as it applies to
the law of torts is contained in the Restatement of Torts II:
"§

7.

Injury and Harm

"(1)
The word 'injury' is used throughout the
Restatement of this Subject to denote the invasion
of any legally protected interest of another.
(2)
The word 'harm' is used throughout the
Restatement of this Subject to denote the existence
of loss or detriment in fact of any kind to a person
resulting from any cause.
(3)
The words 'physical harm' are used throughout
the Restatement of this Subject to denote the
physical impairment of the human body, or of land
or chattels."
(emphasis added)
It is clear that ·in defining the term "injury" as used
in the Utah Code, there must be an invasion of a legally protected
interest.

Furthermore, had the legislature intended to say that

the statute would commence to run from the time of physical harm
as that term is defined in the Restatement of Torts, it would
have used the term "physical harm."
The legally protected interest in this case is not
the actual physical damage standing alone.

Rather, it is the

emergence of a cause of action sounding in tort at the time when
Plaintiff discovered or in the exercise of ordinary care should
have discovered, that his treating physician had breached
his legal duty to Mr. Conk.
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The better reasoned case authority supports the
above propostion.

The case of Hunter v. Knight, 571 P2d.

212 (Wash. 1977) involved the alleged malpractice of an
accounting firm.

The Washington Supreme Court held that the

statute begins to run only when all of the elements necessary
to the maintenance of a lawsuit are present.

The Court

said that the "critical point of inquiry" is the later
event the absence of which makes suit impossibe or improbable,
thi~s

In a California case that stood among other

for the proposition that the "patient is entitled to rely
upon the physician's professional skill and judgment while
under his care, and has little choice but to do so
Court also made it clear that "Since .

•

, II f

tho

(1963), it had been

clear that the limitations period did not conunence until the
plaintiff either (1) actually discovered his injury and its
negligent cause or (2) could have discovered injury and
cause through the exercise of reasonable diligence."

~

v. South Hoover Hospital, 553 P.2d 1129 (Cal. 1976) at 1132. b
omitted) (Emphasis added).

The Court went on to analyze

the recent California statute which is very similar to the
current Utah limitation in malpractice cases by stating what
"injury" means.
The legislative history to which we previously
have alluded gives no indication that the drafters
of section 340.5 either intended to modify the
,
common law "discovery" rule in the foregoing fashion
or to effect such a change by focusing on the tem
"injury." In fact, the word "injury" had come ,
to be used in the cases to denote both a person_3.
hysical condition and its "ne li ent cause." , ~
We think that t e Legislature in enacting section ,
intended no more than to adopt the prior "discoveG
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rule, and that the word "injury" retained, in the
context used, the broad meaning the courts had
pr~viously given to it.
553 P2d at 1133.
(Citations
omitted) (Emphasis added)
The Sanchez court affirmed the trial court's granting
of summary judgment because the plaintiff had discovered her
physical injury and the negligent cause therefore more than the
limitation period prior to filing.
Frohs v. Greene, 452 P2d 564 (Or. 1969) similarly
stated the gross inequity that would exist if "injury"
was to be defined in the narrow terms of the trial court in the
present case before the Court.
. • . It is manifestly unrealistic and unfair to
bar a negligently injured party's cause of action
before he has had an opportunity to discover that
it exists.
This is true whether the malpractice
consists of leaving a foreign object in the body or
whether it consists of faulty diagnosis or treatment.
The followng language used in Berry v. Branner,
supra, at page 312, 421 P.2d at page 998, when
construing the Oregaon statute, is equally applicable to all kinds of malpractice:
"* * * To say that a cause of action accrues to
a person when she may maintain an action thereon
and, at the same time, that it accrues before she
has or can reasonably be expected to have knowledge
of any wrong inflicted upon her is patently inconsistent and unrealistic.
She cannot maintain an
action before she knows she has one. To say to
one who has been wronged, 'You had a remedy, but
before the wrong was ascertainable to you, the
law stripped you of your remedy,' makes a mockery
of the law.
* *·"

We do not believe that the danger of spurious claims
is so great as to necessitate the infliction of
injustice on persons having legitimate claims which
were undiscoverable by the exercise of ordinary
care prior to the lapse of two years from the time
of the act inflictingthe injury. Nor do we
believe the legislature intended such a resul~. .
452 P.2d at 565. (Emphasis added)
See also Billings
v. sister of Mercy Hospital, supra. and Renner v.
Edwards, supra.
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Just decisions as those noted above are not limited
to the Western United States.

In 1978 the North Carolina Supr;

Court, in Ballenger v. Crowell, supra in applying its

vari~lt

of the "course of treatment" rule limited by the "discovery
rule" in a malpractice action against a physician who alleged!:
caused a patient's narcotic addiction, adopted the following
language from two other jurisdictions:
"(THE) limitation period starts to run when the
patient discovers . . • the negligent act which
caused his injury." Jones v. Sugar, 305 A.2d at
223 (Md.)
"(T)he injury may be readily apparent, but the
fact of wrong may lay hidden until after the
prescribed time has passed." Also see Lopez v. Swyer
supra 300 A.2d at 567.
New Hampshire likewise has the rule that a
physically injured individual must "discover" both the
physical injury as well as wrongful conduct or negligence.
Brown v. Memorial Hospital, 378 A.2d 1138 (N.H. 1977).
Justice Maughan writing the opinion for the court
in the case of Vincent v.

s.

L. County, 583 P.2d 105 (Utah

1978) considered an analogous situation.

There, a homeowner

suffered damage to his home from water undermining his
foundation. He didn't know from where the water was coming
until after the notice period for the county had run.
Ultimately the plaintiff found that the county had negligently
caused the water to run which damaged his home.

The court

approvingly adopted the language from its previous decision
on malpractice limitations in the Christiansen case supra:
"It seems somewhat incongruous that an injured
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person must commence a malpracice action prior to the time he
knew or reasonably could have known of his injury and right of
action."

(Emphasis added)
It would seem more than "somewhat" incongruous

to interpret the legislature's intent in any way other than that
"injury" equals "physical harm" plus a "legally invaded right."
To rule otherwise would create a great social evil.

This

court should not say to Ralph Conk, "You had a remedy but
before the wrong was ascertainable to you, the law stripped
you of your remedy."

Frohs v. Greene, supra.

C.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ITS
INSTRUCTION 24 WHEREIN IT INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT "IF THE
PLAINTIFF BECAME AWARE OF FACTS THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES,
WOULD HAVE ALERTED AN ORDINARY AND PRUDENT PERSON TO THE
POSSIBILITY THAT SOME UNEXPECTED HARM MAY HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY
THE SURGEON, THEN HE IS ALSO DEEMED TO HAVE DISCOVERED THE
INJURY ON THAT DATE. I
For the same reasons that the Court committed error
in Instruction 25, Instruction 24 is erroneous.

This instruction

assumes that "injury" only relates to physical harm.

The

case authority previously cited demonstrates incongruities and
missapplication of legislative intent of such a standard.

The stand-

ard is not when the ordinary and prudent person would have been
alerted that some unexpected harm was caused by the surgery,
but rather when the plaintiff discovered or by reasonable
diligence he should have discovered his physical harm and
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the negligent cause of his physical injuries.

No further

case authority need be cited for this position.
Further, presenting two such instructions to the
jury with their improper standard only stands to emphasize and
enlarge their import to a jury thereby aggravating their
prejudicial effect.

See Devine v. Cook, 279 P.2d 1073 (Utahli

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
D.
NOT GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND IN
NOT GRANTING HIS MOTION FOR NEli' TRIAL ON THE ISSUE OF THE STAIC
OF LIMITATIONS.
It is now appropriate to put the legal standards in
the context of the facts at issue before the court.

At the

conclusion of the evidence, plaintiff made a Motion for a
Directed Verdict on the issue of the statute of limitations.
That issue was renewed with the plaintiff's Motion for New Tri;
Both motions were denied by the trial court.

It is plaintiff':

position that the evidence taken in its entirety does not
support submission of this issue to the jury either under
the erroneous instructions given to the jury or the correct
standard discussed earlier.
This cause of action was filed on July 29, 1976.

(R.

Mr. Conk first consulted with the defendant doctor on March
28, 1973 (R. 790).

The ileal bypass surgery was performed at

the Valley West Hospital on April 23, 1973.

(R. 800)

Therefo~

purposes of the tolling the statute of limitations we are
primarily concerned about Mr. Conk's discovering his "injury"
(as that term has been defined herein) prior to July 29, 197 4·
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To begin with, there is absolutely no evidence
that:
1.

Prior to July 29, 1974, Mr. Conk became aware

of any preexisting kidney problems that would have contraindicated
surgery;
2.

Mr. Conk was aware of any kidney problems

possibly associated with his bypass surgery at any time
prior to the difficulties that demonstrated themselves
beginning in January, 1975;
3.

Mr. Conk was ever aware of the experimental

nature of the operation prior to his last treatment by the
defendant in 1975;

4.

Dr. Chambers ever informed the patient that

any of the conditions he was experiencing were in any way
out of the ordinary for a postoperative bypass patient prior to
the kidney problems that were diagnosed in the early months
of 1975;
5.

Mr. Conk should not have relied on the assurances

given to him by the defendant that his condition would stabilize,
nor that he didn't rely on those assurances.
During the entire period of time prior to the first
of 1975, Mr. conk testified that Dr. Chambers told him that
his condition would stablize, that his condition would smooth
out, that it would improve, that what he was experienceing was
to be expected in the type of surgery he had and that he would
be alright (R. 997, 1000, 1004, 1006, 1064, 1068).
Mr. conk further testified that he had confidence in
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the doctor, that he was the professional, that he was of the
th~~

opinion that the doctor knew what he was talking about,
had no complaints about the doctor's care, and that the
doctor was doing his best (R. 999, 1004, 1007).

It is of more than passing interest to note again
that Dr. Chambers did not refute giving Mr. Conk the assurance:
noted.
A study of Dr. Chambers direct testimony demonstrate:
clearly what was being told his patient on various postoperati':
examinations:
September 28, 1973-Q

Will you tell us what was written by you and what

was written by the nurse, please?
A

"Post-operative check five months."

"No complaints, some malaise.

My note says,

Happy about operation.

(R. lli

December 24, 1973-Q

Tell us what is noted, please?.

A

79 pound weight loss, blood pressure 150 over

My entry, "no symptoms, doing very well on blood

110.

pressure medicine."

(R.

1151)

May 10, 1974-Q

Give us the notes and what you found and what you wrot:

A

"post-operative check 13 months.

160 over 110.

Weight loss 92 pounds.

Blood pressure

Plateau of weight.

Has been eating heavily and working hard.

Color good.

Patient looks almost good enough, but could lose some more wei~
(R.

1153)
Laboratory test June 14, 1974-Q

All right.

Now, can you look in your laboratory
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reports and tell us the results of the chemistry survey?
I can call your attention to the date of about June 14th,
12th to 14th would be the last sheet that you would be looking for.
A

The laboratory test is dated June 14, 1974.

* * * * *
Q

Did you find any abnormal reading in any of those

chemistries of the blood?
A

No, sir.

Q

Any of the electrolytes that were abnormal or lower than

normal?
A

No, sir, they are all normal.

(R.

1154-1155)

August 1, 1974-Q

What does that say?

A

That says "15 months post-operative, 99 pounds weight

loss, blood pressure 150 over 100.

Charleyhorse in both legs."

Q

This is what the nurse wrote about the patient?

A

Yes, this is the nurse's note of his complaint,

charleyhorse in both legs.
shunt very good.
Q

My note says, "Post-operative

Vitamin B12 given."

Now, at that point when you say very good, that's

compared to what?

What you would expect or what the normal

is, or what?
A

I

would say very good for the course of the post-

operative intestinal shunt patient.

(R.

1155)

December 30, 1974-Q

All right.

Now, we go into December 30th of '74, or

31st, whichever it is.

Tell us what she wrote and what the

readings were and what you found and what you noted?
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the fiduciary and confidential patient-doctor relationship.
As the Supreme Court of California (which has a statute

si~~

to that of Utah) has put it:
the patient is fully entitled to rely upon
the physician's professional skill and judgment
while under his care, and has little choice but~
do so.
It follows, accordingly, that during the
continuance of his professional relationship, whi~
is fiduciary in nature, the degree of diligence requt
of a patient in ferreting out and learning the
negligent causes of his condition is diminished .
Sanchez v. South Hoover, supra~ 553 P.2d at 1135.
Because the statute of limitations is an affirmative
defense, defendant has the burden to show by a preponderance oi
discov~~

the evidence that Mr. Conk discovered or should have
his "injury" on or before July 29, 1974.

There being no evide:.

of actual discovery of the injury by the plaintiff,

defenda~

must affirmatively show that through the use of reasonable
diligence Mr. Conk should have discovered the injury prior
to that date.

That reasonable dilignce would, arguendo,

require Mr. Conk to inquire of Dr. Chambers into what the
status of his condition was; was it caused by the operation;
and was his condition any different than would have been
normal given the nature of the procedure.
In order for the defendant to prevail on that iss~,
he must present subs tan ti ve evidence that Mr. Conk' s inquiries
would reasonably have led him to discover that the effects of
the operation were adverse to his heal th and contrary to what
was normal for a postoperative ileal bypass patient.

Such an

inquiry to Dr. Chambers would have revealed the facts

previ~~

stated to the effect that all was well.

The doctor himself

had no idea by his own testimony of any untoward, unanticipateL
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negative turn to the physical condition of his patient
postoperatively.
The defendant simply failed to produce any evidence
support that affirmative burden.

It is patently ridiculous to place

the burden on Ralph Conk to diagnose kidney problems when his
own doctor could not do so himself.
The above argument is based solely on discovery of
physical harm.

It becomes more persuasive if the correct

definition of "injury" as being physical harm plus invasion of legally
protected right is added to the equation.

No evidence was

presented by defendant to demonstrate that such inquiry would have
been fruitful at any relevent time.

Mr. Conk's reliance on his

fiduciary is by substantive evidence unassailed and uncontroverted.
As to its reasonableness, no triggering event took place to shake
that relationship until the first evidence of kidney damage
occurred in the first part of 1975.
The statute of limitations should not have been submitted
to the jury as an issue for its consideration.
POINT II
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT APPELLANT'S
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT FOR NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO OBTAIN
INFORMED CONSENT PRIOR TO SURGERY, AND IN IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTING
THE JURY ON THAT ISSUE.
It has become universally recognized that prior to
performing a surgical procedure a physician owes his patient
a duty to inform him of the treatment options available and the
risks attendant with each to allow the patient a meaningful
opportunity to grant or withold his knowing and informed
consent to the treatment contemplated by the physician.
Dunham v. wright, 423 F.2d 920, 943-46 (3rd Cir. 1970)

See, e.g.,
(applying
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Pennsylvania law); Campbell v. Oliva, 424 F.2d 1244, 1250-51
(6th Cir. 1970)

(applying Tennesse law); Woods v. Brumlop, 7!

N.M. 221, 337 P.2d 520, 524-25 (1962); Mason v. Ellsworth,
Wash. App. 298, 474 P.2d 909, 918-19 (1970).
In the instant case, the appellant alleged, among
others, that Dr. Chambers failed to advise him of two material
facts pertaining to the intestinal bypass operation:

1) that

t

operation was still experimental in nature and without sufficiE·
history to have all of its side effects known; and 2) that
it would result in increased stress being placed upon the
patient's kidneys, making any kidney disease a contraindicatior
to the performance of the operation.
The respondent testified unequivocally at trial that
the intestinal bypass he performed on Mr. Conk was an experimental operation and that it was important that the patient

~

advised of this fact:
Q (By Mr. Black)

Now, Doctor, during the time that you

proceeded through these 25 operations, this particular intestir:
bypass operation was experimental, was it not?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

And it was important, and is important in the

medical profession, that in the event a doctor undertakes to
perform an experimental operation with the results of such
operation being unknown to the profession and the consequent
risks that are involved in unknown results, to tell the
patient forthright that the operation was, in fact, an
experimental kind of operation?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

And as a matter of fact, in the other hearing in t~c
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matter, your other patient in 1972, you advised that patient
that the operation was experimental, and you stated in a
deposition in that case that you advised the patient that it
was experimental because you thought the patient ought to
know that fact;
A

isn't that true?

Yes, sir.

(R. 787-88).

Mr. Conk testified that he was never informed that
the operation was experimental.

(R. 435-36).

Dr. Chambers

indicated at his deposition that he did not think he advised
Mr. Conk of the experimental nature of the operation, but at
trial he gave a different version:
Q

And as a matter of fact, when we come down to April

of 1973 when you first saw Mr. Conk, when you talked to him
about this particular operation, you did not advise Mr.
Conk that the operation was experimental, did you?
A

I

don't believe that's correct, sir.

Q

You don't believe that you didn't advise him?

A

I

Q

Well now, Doctor, you will recall that I

believe I

did.
took your

deposition in this case on the 1st day of June, 1977, at
my office?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

And Mr. Snow was present, who is your counsel?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

You were again placed under oath?

A

Yes, sir.

Q
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Q

THE COURT:

lvha t page?

MR. BLACK:

Again at page 17, line 19.

And I will ask you to read along with me.

Did you or

did you not make the following answers to the following questic
"Question:

Did you tell him that this was an experi-

mental operation?
"Answer:

No, I don't think so."

Did you or did you not make that answer to that quest;:
on that occasion?
A

I did.

Q

But you will concede before this Court and jury at

this time that if an operation which is proposed is, in fact,
experimental, the patient ought to know; is that not true?
A

Yes ,sir.

Q

But this patient wasn't told that, was he?

A

I said "I think" in that one; I say "I think" now.

I believe I did.
Q

Well, if you did, then you testified falsely on this

occasion, is that right?
A
(R.

I said "I think" in there, and I say it again today.

788-89).

Appellant submits that on the basis of this testimon:
it would be error to make any finding that Dr. Chambers inforik
Mr. Conk of the experimental nature of the operation.

Pitt~

against the patient's unambiguous denial that he ever receiv~
any warning that the operation was an experiment, the physiciai
inconsistent responses that at one time he felt he didn't
inform and later felt he did inform Mr. Conk of the nature of
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the procedure are insufficient to present a jury question on -the
issue.

Where a witness' testimony is as internally inconsistent

as to refute itself, it is insufficient to support a finding on
an ultimate issue.

See, e.g., State v. Pratt, 25 Utah 2d 76,

475 P.2d 1013 (1970); Alvardo v. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16, 268
P.2d 986

(1954).
Moreover, on the issue of the hazzard presented by the

increased stress placed on the patient's kidneys due to the
operation, there is no dispute that the appellant was not
informed of such increased stress or of the fact that he, in
the opinion of Dr. Chambers, had damaged kidneys before the
operation was performed.

Dr. Chambers testified that he never

informed Mr. Conk that an added burden would be placed on
his kidneys after the operation (R. 793), and responded as
follows to further questions on the subject:
Q

Now, it would be very important for you as a treating

physician to know, if it be a fact, that a patient had a kidney
problem prior to such an operation; isn't that true?
A

I don't know what "kidney problem" means.

Q

Well, I think the word "problem" is a word that we

all understand.

If a person had a problem with his kidneys,

it would be important that you know that before you perform this
operation, wouldn't it?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

And why would it be important?

A

Well, the obviously continuing the function of the

kidneys through the operative period and the post-operative
period.
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Q

And that would be a matter you would take under advis,.

and into consideration in determing whether a patient was a
proper candidate for a bypass operation?
A

Yes, sir.

(R.

793-94)

* * * * *
Q

And if he had a significant problem you would abort th;

operation, wouldn't you?
A

That is correct, sir.

Q

And if he had a significant problem, you would at leas;

tell him so and tell him how that was involved in the decisior.making with regard to the performance of this operation?
A

That is correct, sir.

Q

And as a matter of fact, Dr. Chambers, the Granger

Medical Clinic records reveal that Mr. Conk, in fact, had a
kidney problem at the time that you made the determination to
perform this operation?
Well, I'm waiting for your answer.
A

I wasn't asked for an answer, sir.
MR. BLACK:

Would you read the question?

(The question was read by the reporter.)
A

I don't agree with that statement.

You didn't ask

me a question, but I don't agree with it.

Q

You don't think he had any kidney problem at all?

A

Yes, I think he had a problem related to his hypertens:

the kidney problem that goes with hypertension.
Q

That isn't the way you answered the question when

your deposition, is it, Dr. Chambers?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-42-

r toe

s:

oc

And I will ask you to read with me the following question
and the following answer.
THE COURT:
Q

What page?

And this in on line 8, page 19:
"Question:

And in this connection, did you become

aware of the fact, if it be a fact, that he'd had some kidney
problems before this time?
"Answer:

No."

Did you answer that question in that manner?
A

Yes, sir.

(R. 794-96)

* * * * *
Q

Although you never told Mr. Conk anything about his

kidneys in discussing this operation with him, at the time
you discussed it with him you knew that he was suffering from
kidney damage; isn't that true?
A

Not necessarily kidney damage at the time I operated, sir.

Q

Well, Dr. Chambers, down the road a ways on November 18,

1975, you wrote a letter "To Whom It May Concern" regarding
Mr. Ralph Conk, and signed your name to it.

It's marked

Plaintiff's Exhibit 13-P, and I will ask you to examine that
letter and state to this Court and jury whether you, in fact,
wrote the letter and affixed your signature to it?
A

I did write this letter as of November 18th, 1975,

and this is my signature.
Q

And the subject matter of that letter is Mr. Conk's

kidneys, is it not?
A

Yes, sir.
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Q

And that letter, or a copy of it, is located in the

Granger Medical Clinic records, is it not?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

And it' s a part of Mr. Conk' s records that you brought

court here with you today?
A

Yes, sir.
MR. BLACK:
MR. SNOW:
THE COU IT:

We offer the exhibit, your Honor.
No objection.
Exhibit 13-P is received.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 13 was received
into evidence.)
MR. BLACK:

We ask permission to read the exhiL

to the jury, your Honor.
THE COURT:
MR. SNOW:

Any objection?
No.

THE COURT:

You may

MR. BLACK:

On Granger Medical Clinic stationer.

dated November 18, 1975.
"To Whom It May Concern:
"Re:

Mr. Ralph Conk

"Mr. Ralph Conk was referred to me by ~.
Lavere Poulsen on March 28, 1973.

At that time he had seven

obesity that had not responded to the usual measures of treatr
He also had severe hypertension.
"On April 23, 1975, I performed an intestinal
shunt procedure because of the obesity and the hypertensiOO·
His immediate post-operative course went very well.
"At the time I first saw Mr. Conk prior to hi
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5

intestinal shunt procedure, he had severe hypertension which,
of course, meant that he had kidney damage which occurred with
it.

Kidney function tests as early as March, 1972, showed some

elevation of urea nitrogen.
"It is my impression that there was kidney damage
related to the hypertension prior to his intestinal shunt
procedure.
"Signed Wallace L. Chambers, M.D."

Q

Is that a correct recitation of that letter?

A

One mistake there, and it's in there, too.

Q

Did I correctly read the letter, Doctor?

A

You correctly read the letter, and there is a mistake.

The operation was April 23, 1973.

Q

Thank you.

It does say "75 there.

And that is an incorrect recitation of

the date.
And at the time that you decided on this operation, number
one, you didn't tell him about the information contained in
this letter, did you?
A

I told him about his hypertension, and this letter states

that the kidney damage is related to his hypertension.
talked about his hypertension.
kidney damage.

(R.

And I

I did not talk about

798-800)

Mr. Conk also confirmed the fact that he wasn't
informed about the possible alteration of the function of the
kidneys or the fact of his already existing kidney damage.
Q

Mr. conk, what, if anything, did Dr. Chambers tell you

roncerning what the Granger Medical Clinic records showed as
of April 1973 concerning kidney damage as a result of a longSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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standing high blood pressure condition?
A

He told me nothing.

Q

What, if anything, did Dr. Chambers tell you concernk

what the effects of this operation ~ight have on your kidney~
A

He didn't tell me anything about my kidneys.

Q

What change in the course of your conduct would you ha

done had you been told that this bypass procedure was, because
of its very nature, a dehydrating procedure and could cause
further damage to your kidneys?
A

I would never have had it.

Q

What, if anything, did the doctor tell you about the

possibility of kidney stones occurring as a result of this
surgery?
A

He didn't tell me anything about the kidneys.

The kidneys were never mentioned.

Q

What, if anything, did he tell you concerning whethH

or not, in order to be a candidate for this procedure, an
individual should have either--well, strike that.

Let me

restate the question, Mr. Conk.
What, if anything, did Dr. Chambers tell you concernin:
the advisability of having this operation should an indivi~~
have a pre-existing renal or kidney disease?
A

He didn't tell me anything about the kidney disease.

he had told me any ting about the kidney disease, I would never
have the operation.
of.

Kidney disease, I was very, very frighten'

I watched my favorite uncle pass away with kidney disease

and if anything at any time would have showed me that it wouli
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have affected my kidneys, I would have stayed within miles of·
it.

There would be no way I would have had the operation.

(R. 1038-39)
The significance of a physician's failure to inform
his patient of the risks inherent in a particular surgical
procedure is that it deprives an individual of the right to
make his own determination, on the basis of adequate facts,
of what is to be done with his own body.
When initially confronted with the problem of
determining the scope of a physician's duty of disclosure,
courts tended to view the disclosure requirement as an aspect
of medical practice which should be judged by the same rules
applicable to performance of surgery, forming a diagnosis, or
prescribing medication:

did the physician's practice meet the

standard of care of a reasonably competent medical practitioner
performing in the same or similar circumstances?

The duty of

disclosure was viewed in reference to a medical standard, and
the standard was set by physicians practicing under like circumstances. As a result, expert testimony was required to
establish the appropriate standard before any breach of that
standard could be found.
More recently, however, the law has come to recognize
that in disclosure cases the proper focus should be upon the
needs of the patient and not the practice of the profession.
The patient's right of self-determination is the overriding
concern and medical considerations only become relevant when
disclosure itself would have a dramatically adverse effect on
the patient's health.

Under this formulation of the standard, a
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physician is negligent if he fails to inform his patient of ar.
material risks involved in the proposed procedure, and he is
liable in damages if the patient suffered harm as a result of
such procedures being performed without his informed conseAf,
In Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. ir
the court called into question the practice of judging of a
physician's duty of disclosure in terms of its compliance wiE
the practice prevailing in the medical community.

The court

noted that, in reality, there is serious doubt as to whether
any discernible custom exists among doctors evidencing a
professional concensus on what is proper communciation of ris:
information to patients.

As the court noted, there is a

. . danger that what in fact is no custom
at all may be taken as an affirmative custom
to maintain silence, and that physician- witnesses to the so-called custom may state merely
their personal opinions as to what they
or others would do under given conditions.
we cannot gloss over the inconsistency between
reliance on a general practice respecting
divulgence and, on the other hand, realization
that the myriad of variables among patients
makes each case so different that its omission
can rationally be justified only by the effect
of its individual circumstances.
Nor can we
ignore the fact that to bind the disclosure
obligation to medical usage is to abrogate the
decision on revelation to the physician alone.
Respect for the patient's right of selfdetermination on particular therapy demands a
standard set by law for physicians rather than
one which physicians may or may not impose
upon themselves.
464 F.2d at 783-84 (footnotes
omitted).
The court held that expert testimony is not ess~~
to establish a doctor's duty to disclose risks of a propso~
treatment.

The court stated that lay witness testimony can

competently establish a physician's failure to disclose
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particular risk information, the materiality of a risk to the
patient's decision

on whether to undergo the proposed treatment,

or to the effect reasonably expectable if the disclosure had
been made.

While the court noted that expert testimony would

be needed to identify and elucidate for the factfinder the risks
of the proposed treatment, the standard of care required of
the physician in making disclosure about such risks was expressly
held not to be dependent upon the practice of physicians in the
community.
Similarly, in Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d
1 (1972), the court held that expert testimony is not required
to establish a doctor's duty to disclose risks of a proposed
treatment.

Stressing that the rule of many courts, relating the

reasonablness of a physician's disclosure to the custom of
physicians in the community, was needlessly overbroad, the court
reasoned that even if there can be said to be a medical community
standard as to the disclosure requirement for any prescribed
treatment, it appears so nebulous that doctors become, in effect,
vested with virtual absolute discretion.

To bind the disclosure

obligation to medical usage, the court declared, is to leave
the decision on disclosure to the physician alone.

It was pointed

out that unlimited discretion in the physician is irreconcilable
with the basic right of the patient to make the ultimate informed
decision regarding the course of treatment to which he knowledgeably consents.

The court stated that a medical doctor,

being the expert, appreciates the risks inherent in the procedure
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he is prescribing, the risks of a decision not to undergo

t~

treatment, and the probabliity of a successful outcome of

t~

treatment.

However, the court explained that once this

information has been disclosed, the doctor's expert functioo
has been performed, the weighing of these risks against

t~

subjective fears and hopes of the patient not being an
expert skill.

a~

It was emphasized that such an evaluation

decision is a nonmedical judgment reserved to the patient
alone.

Stressing that the scope of the disclosure required

of physicians defies simple definition, the court stated
that the scope of the required disclosure must be measured
by the patient's need, and that this need is for whatever
information is material to the decision whether to undergo
the proposed treatment.
In Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. 260, 286

A.~

647 (1971), where the plaintiff patient alleged tht she shooli
been warned of the risk of perforation of her stomach from a
gastroscopic examination, the court, reversing a judgment for
the two defendant doctors, rejected a requirement of expert
testimony to establish a doctor's duty to disclose a given~
of a proposed teatment as unacceptable since such a requirement failed to produce equitable results and demeaned the
concept of physical integrity of the individual.

While statin

that it had high regard for the professionalism of the medicai
community, the court noted that the standard of disclosure
within the medical community bears no inherent relationship tc
the amount of knowledge that any particualr patient might
Further
justifl'l
Sponsored by thein
S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
for digitization
provided by the Institute
of Museum and Library
Services
require
order
to Funding
make
an informed
choice.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-50-

S'

c

its conclusion that expert testimony was not necessary in a
disclosure of risk case, the court stated that any physician
testifying on the issue of the duty of disclosure would be
testifying as to either what he would have done under similar
circumstances, or as to what he thinks another practitioner
should have done under such circumstances, neither of which
supplies an adequate definition of the "community standard."
It was also noted that the plaintiff's difficulty in finding
a physician to testify against another physician had to be
considered.

The court stated that an equitable test in

disclosure of risk cases would be whether the physician disclosed all those facts, risks, and alternatives that a reasonable man, in the situation which the physician knew or should
have known to be the plaintiff's, would deem significant in
making a decision to under go the recommended treatment.

In

addition, calling attention to the rule that generally in
medical malpractice suits expert testimony is required, the
court stated that there is a basic distinction between the
normal malpractice suit, where the issue is whether the
physician failed to conform to accepted medical practice,
and informed consent cases, where the salient question is
whether the patient made an effective assent to treatment and
where the determination of whether there was any dereliction
of professional duty on the part of thephysician is only one
factor in the resolution of the ultimate issue.
This view of the applicable standard in disclosure
cases is clearly the modern trend among courts which have
considered the question in recent years.
Hardy, 549 P.2d 1099 (Colo. App. 1976);

See, e.g., Hamilton v.
Zeleznik v. Jewish
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Chronic Disease Hosp., 47 App. Div. 2d 199, 366 N.Y.S.2d 163
(1973); Congrove v. Holmes, 37 Ohio Misc. 95, 308 N.E. 2d
765 (1975); Small v. Gifford Memorial Hosp, 349 A.2d 703
(Vt. 1974); Holt v. Nelson, 523 P.2d 211 (Wash. App. 1974);

as

Miller v. Kennedy, 522 P.2d 852 (Wash. App. 1974), aff'd
Wash. 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334 (1975); Getchell v. Mansfield,
260 Or. 174, 489 P.2d 953 (1971).

The fundamental principles set forth in these cases
are that a patient has the right to be informed about:

1) Ak

native treatments to that proposed by the physician; 2)
reasonably forseeable material risks involved in each

all

altem~

including that proposed by the physician; and 3) the risks inL
in no treatment at all.

The courts have frequently emphasizec

that "materiality" is not a clear cut, self-defining term, bu'.
[t)he factors contributing significance to
the dangerousness of a medical technique are,
of course, the incidence of injury and the
degree of the harm threatened. A very small
chance of death may well be significant; a
potential disability which dramatically outweighs the potential benefit of the therapy
or the detriments of the existing malady
may summon discussion with the patient.
Canterbury v. Spence, supra, 464 F.2d at 788.
If the evidence shows that a physician failed to di:
material risks, then expert testimony can be offered to ~~
that such a failure was justified as proper medical practi~
to protect the patient.

However, as the court noted in

Canterbury v. Spence, supra:
[t)he physician's privilege to withold information for therapeutic reasons must be carefully circumscribed, . . . for otherwise it
might devour the disclosure rule itsel~ . . The
privilege does not accept the pate7nal7stic
notion that the physician may remain silent
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sim~ly because divulgence might prompt the
patient to forego therapy the physician
feels the patient really needs.
That
attitude presumes instablility or perversity
for even the normal patient, and runs
counter to the foundation principle that
the patient should and ordinarily can make
the choice for himself.
464 F.2d 789.

The sole purpose for the expert testimony on the
standard of disclosure in the medical profession would be to
show a specific justification that could be considered by the trier
of fact, but only as it effects the legal duty imposed upon
physicians to reveal all material risks.

It is in the nature

of a defense to the prima facie breach of the duty imposed
by law, not a yardstick of the duty itself, and even as a

defense it would only justify non-disclosure when such disclosure would have demonstrably adverse effect on the patient.
See Hamilton v. Hardy, supra.
In summary, courts are now recognizing that a physician's
duty of disclosure to his patient is not defined in terms of
medical practice, but rather by the needs of the patient and
his right of self-determination.
In the instant case, Dr. Chambers admittedly did not
inform the appellant of the risks posed to the continued function
of his kidneys and wasn't certain whether or not he even advised
Mr. Conk of many other ill effects which might be seen to flow
from the operation which, due to its experimental nature, were
as yet unknown.
This type of information is precisely what a patient
deserves to know prior to consenting to an operation, and particularly
an elective surgery such as that presented in this matter.
The normal test, whether a physician informed his
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patient of all forseeable material risks inherent in the 0 ~~
cannot be used to determine the duty to disclose the

experi~~

nature of an operation because, by definition, many of what wi:
bee~~

later be found to be material risks are totally unknown
the procedure is new.

It would be absurd to allow a physician

to have no dialogue at all about the risk factor of a surgery
simply because it is so novel that the risks are unknown.
When such is the case, the doctor should, as a mater of law,
inform the patient that many of the potential dangers of the
surgery are as yet unknown and allow the patient to weigh
for himself his desire for treatment against the fear of
the unknown.

This subjective decision of whether to proceed

when much is not known is one for the patient, not the

physi~
s~r

While this issue appears to be novel, appellant

that it is also irrefutable that a doctor owes as great a duty
to disclose what he admittedly does not and cannot be expectec
to know as that which he does know.

Appellant respectfully

requests this Court to hold that as a matter of law a physici«
breaches his duty to obtain a patient's informed consent

wh~

he does not disclose that a surgical procedure is experime~~
and that this duty was breached in the instant action.
Alternatively, appellant submits that Dr. Chambers'
failure to disclose to Mr. Conk the condition of his kidne~
prior to the surgery and the adverse effect the surgery c~N
have on damaged kidneys constituted a breach of the duty owed
by all physicians to inform their patients of all material
risks involved in their treatment.

Clearly, Dr. Chambers ~U

the condition of Mr. Conk' s kidneys prior to surgery was sigP
cant or he would not have noted it for the record after t~~
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and the onset of Mr. Conk's more pronounced kidney disease.

As it

was significant, Mr. Conk should have been so advised prior
to surgery.
The court below erred by failing to direct the jury
that Dr. Chambers had breached his duty of disclosure to Mr.
Conk and focusing their inquiry on whether such breach caused
the appellant any damage.

This error demands that the matter

be reversed and remanded for consideration of the question of
damage.
Even assuming the court was correct in allowing the
issue of informed consent to go to the jury, the instructions
given by the court, and excepted to by appellant, improperly
stated the law and were internally inconsistent, thereby
requiring reversal of the judgment entered below.
In instruction number 15 the court charged the jury
that Dr. Chambers owed Mr. Conk the duty to advise him of "any
risks or uncertainties involved in the operation" of which he
was aware or should have been aware, including the fact that the
operation was experimental.

(R. 154) In the next instruction,

number 16, the court informed the jury that the physician's duty
was to inform Mr. Conk of those "reasonably anticipated risks
and complications as would have been disclosed as part of the
accepted practice" of doctors practicing in accord with the
professional standard of care.

The court further indicated that

To prevail on this issue, plaintiff must prove
each of the following propositions:
1.
That in discussing the operation with him
Dr. chambers failed to conform to the standard
of disclosure which was required by accepted
medical practice among surgeons practicing at
that time, and
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..
2.
That a reasonably prudent person who had been
considering an intestinal by-pass operation for
weight reduction would have refused the operation 1,
·
such disclosure had been made by the defendant.
In determining what a reasonably prudent person
in the patient's position would do under the ciu~
stances, you must use the viewpoint of the patient
before the surgery was performed and before the
occurrence of any complications or harmful results
alleged to have resulted from the surgery.
These two instructions are inconsistent with each
other, as the first imposes a duty to inform concerning subjec:
which the physician knows or has reason to know present risks
or uncertainties, while the latter instruction limits this
duty by excusing failure to inform of known risks or uncertair
if the "accepted medical practice" would have been to withoW
such information.

As demonstrated in the above, defining

the disclosure duty in terms of medical practice is error
because it is inconsistent with the overridding interest of
the patient in having as complete knowledge as possible when
choosing what course to follow.

The medical standard of

care defines what the physician should know, but the legal
duty to reveal that information should not be restricted or
modified by any prevailing practice among physicians of not
disclosing risks, or uncertainties, of which they are requ~s
to be aware.
Had the court not modified instruction 15 with the
improper standard set forth in the next instruction, the jury
would have been free to determine that Dr. Chambers breached
his duty to the appellant by failing to inform him of the
experimental nature of the operation or the hazards posed to'.
kidneys.

However, instruction 16 adds an additional element

necessary to establish a breach of duty, namely that such fa:
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to disclose was inconsistent with established medical practice.
Appellant submits that this is an improper standard under the cases
set forth above and one which imposes upon a plaintiff the
untenable burden of showing that not only did the physician
fail to disclose facts he knew or should have known which were
material to the operation, but that other physicians would
have affirmatively disclosed such facts.

This elevates the

importance attached to a fact by the doctor over that which
would be attached to the same information by the patient,and
it is the patient's right of self-determination which courts
now recognize as the predicate giving rise to the duty to disclose.
Such duty is rendered hollow if physicians retain the ultimate
right to limit that duty by community practice; that is,

by setting a medical standard governing what facts patients
are entitled to know and what facts they are not prior to giving
their consent.
It is axiomatic that it is reversable error for the
court to give inconsistent or contradictory insturctions on a
material issue of a case.

As early as 1900 the Utah Supreme Court

acknowledged that
[i]instructions on a material point in a
case which are inconsistent or contradictory,
should not be given.
The giving of such instructions
is error and a sufficient ground of reversal because it' is impossible after verdict to ascertain
which instruction the jury followed, or what
influence the erroneous instruction had in their
deliberation.
Konold v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 21 Utah 379, 399 (1900).
Appellant submits that the court's instruction number
16 is an inaccurate statement of the duty owed by a physician to
his patient
and
inconsistent
with
the
defined
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tion 15.

As such, the giving of the challenged instruction

is reversible error which requires that the case be reman~a
for submission to the jury on the basis of a proper statement
of the law.
POINT III
IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIO:;
9, 10, and 13 DEFINING "SAME OR SIMILAR COMMUNITIES" THE
TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR, PARTICULARLY IN
ALL OF THE INSTRUCTIONS WHEREIN "SAME OR SIMILAR COMMUNITIES"
IS USED DESCRIBING THE STANDARD OF CARE REQUIRED OF NATIONALLY
BOARD CERTIFIED SURGEONS PERFORMING INTESTINAL SHUNTING
PROCEDURES FOR THE PURPOSE OF WEIGHT REDUCTION.
For the convenience of the court we cite herein
Plaintiff's Requested Instructions 9, 10 and 13:
INSTRUCTION NO. 9
On the subject of standard of care of physicians
and/or board certified surgeons in discharging the
duties of their respective profess ions, this Court
has from time to time made reference to the terms
"community" and "similar Communities" and to
physicians and/or board certified surgeons practic·
ing within a "community" or "similar communcities".
You are instructed that the term "similar comrnunitit
for the purpose of this case, means any area of
the United States where physicians and/or board
certified surgeons practice and where operative
procedures are performed, which are similar in
nature to the operative procedure here involved.
(R. 101)
INSTRUCTION NO. 10
You are further instructed that where the evidence
shows a national standard of care to exist with
respect to a particular surgical procedure then
board certified surgeons throughout the nation an
required to perform said procedure in accordance
with said national standard.
(R. 102)
INSTRUCTION NO. 13
Plaintiff suf~icient~y ~eets the burden of proof ~
required of him by snowing by a preponderan~e of .
·
·
· his treat
evidence that the defendant physicain,
in
ment of the plaintiff, either did something thata
board certified surgeon of ordinary skill,
care.al~
.
· l ar
diligence would not have done under like or· Slffi
f ali
·
circumstances, or that said defendant physician
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or omi~ted to ~o something that a board certified surgeon
of ordinary skill, care and diligence would have done
under like or similar circumstances or conditions in
the same or similar communities. The expression
"board certified surgeons of ordinary skill, care
and diligence" as used in this instruction, neans
board certified surgeons possessing that reasonable
degree of professional learning and skill generally
possessed by board certified surgeons of good standing
in the same or in similar communities nationwide.
(R. 107)
The trial court refused to give the above instructions,
leaving to the jury the determination not only of what the
standard was and whether the defendant breached that standard
of care required, but also whether that standard was a national
standard or merely a local standard.
that is error of a very grave nature.

Plaintiff asserts that
If the jury was to

determine that the standard was merely a local standard, or
that plaintiff's experts did not practice in communities similar
to Salt Lake City, then no evidence presented by plaintiff's
experts as to the neglectful performance of the operation and
the negligence in follbw-up care would be considered.

The

two primary experts for the plaintiff were from San Diego
and New York City.
There can be little doubt of the prejudicial and
improper nature of the refusal to give the above instructions
to the jury in light of the recent case of Swan v. Lamb, et al.,
584 P. 2d 814 (Utah 1978).
Justice Ellett succinctly stated for the majority of
the court what law should apply to this type of case concerning
what the appropriate standard of care should be in our modern
and advanced technical age:
It thus appears that in the past, this court
has stated that the doctor in treating a patient
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cannot be held to be negligent unless it is
shown that he did not comply with the standards
used and approved by other doctors in the same
vicinity.
Those holdings were proper at the times
when they were made; however, there is no reason
to hold that doctors in Salt Lake City who profess
to be experts in a field of surgery or medicine
should not be held to the standard of care
exercised by.experts in the same field in cities 0;
comparable size and throughout the medical professi!
Our quality of medical care in Utah rates with t~
best in the nation.
Our hospitals are among the
finest with the most recent technology, and the med•
college at the University of Utah enjoys an outstu~
reputation.
In addition, doctors practicing their
profession here come from various medical colleges
throughout the nation.
Medical journals are availar,
nationally as are seminars and workshops. There is:
need for doctors here to have a lower standard of~
than that of other doctors who are practicing in
similar localities.
Indeed, it is doubtful that~
physician in the State of Utah would be willing~~
that his skill and knowledge is not equal to any ~~
physician trained in his field, or that his ability
is less than that of doctors trained and practicing
in other cities.
True it may be that doctors practicing in small rura
communities cannot be expected to have the facilitit
or the equipment to perform equally as well as can
physicians in Salt Lake City; however, they have
the same quality of training and should know enough
to refuse to undertake operations or to treat patier.:
if they are not in a position to successfully admini:
the needed treatment--save perhaps in emergency case•
If surgeons throughout the nation consider it
improper to allow foreign substances that have ~~
injected into the spinal canal to remain there ~fter
completing a myelogram, it beggars the imagination
to think a doctor in Salt Lake City could escape
responsibility for harm done to his patient by fail;
to remove the substance in the canal so that it m~
be absorbed by the body.
If this procedure is gene'.:
regarded to be unsatisfactory or dangerous, nod~
should escape responsibility merely because the .
local practice has not yet adopted it."
(Emphasis
added)
Without the proffered instruction, there is a
serious likelihood that the jury misunderstood the "similU
locality rule" as it is applied in Utah.

As Justice Wilki~
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noted in his concurring opinion in Swan,
"in determining similarity the courts will not
now look to such socio-economic facts as population,
type of economy, and income level, but to factors
more directly relating to the practice of medicine."
And, Justice Crockett noted that for purposes of this rule,
Los Angeles and Salt Lake City are similar communities, a conclusion
no jury would reach without an adequate definition of the
standard such as the plaintiff offered in this case.
Without the excluded instructions, the jury was left
without proper guidelines as to the standard of care, making
the trial court's Instructions, 12, 14, 15 and 18 and any
other instructions wherein the same or similar community
standard is set forth misleading, improper and prejudicial.
(R.

145, 150, 153, 154, 157.)
It is recognized that certain of the above instructions

are those submitted to the court by plaintiff, however, they
were submitted with Instructions 9, 10, and 13, defining their
meaning.

Absent 9, 10, and 13, the other instructions

erroneously and prejudicially set forth the law.
CONCLUSION
It is claimed by plaintiff herein that the trial
court prejudicially erred in several particulars.

The first

two errors concern the trial Court's Instruction Numbers 24 and
25 that in essence state that the statute of limitations
begins to run before the plaintiff has a reasonable opportunity to know that whatever physical harm he suffered was
caused by the negligence of the defendant doctor.

That

type of instruction is patently contrary to justice,
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legislative intent, the better reasoned trend of authority

Cl,1

in points I B and C herein, and common sense.
Such instructions as the court gave tell an injured
patient that he had a physical injury or harm but before he
had a reasonable opportunity to know that his treating physician had negligently caused that physical injury or harm,
his

~ight

to recourse had expired.

This Court should not

burden this plaintiff and future plaintiffs so heavily.
This matter should be reversed and remanded for a
new trial on that issue alone.

However, the trial court

comrni tted further error in not granting plaintiff's Motion
for Directed Verdict on the issue of the applicable limitation
of actions section of the Utah Code Ann. i.e. § 78-4-14 (supp.
The evidence cited previously in Point I D clearly demonstrate
the defendant did not provide substantive evidence that
plaintiff knew or should have known more than two years prior
to filing his complaint that:

he had suffered any physical

injury to his kidneys; the defendant doctor had not informed r.:
of the experimental nature of the operation; the doctor had
not informed him of the pre-existing kidney damage that was a
contraindication for the bypass surgery; the plaintiff didn't
have the right to rely on the assurances of his treating
physician that he was progressing well and any problems hemij
have been having were the natural anticipated after effec~~
such surgery that would stabilize; or the defendant doctor
had invaded any legally protected right of plaintiff.
Defendant's own testimony as cited hereinbefore unassailab~
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supports simply that he failed in his burden on the affirmative
defense of the statute of limitations.

On remand that issue

should not be presented to the jury.
Other compelling reasons, as shown by the record cited
hereinbefore, demand that this case be remanded for a new
trial on the issues of medical causation and damages only.
The defendant's testimony without reasonable qualification is
that the operation performed on plaintiff was experimental
in nature and that he never told plaintiff of that fact.
Defendant also did not tell the plaintiff that he had a preexisting kidney condition that would be important to consider
in this type of operation and would or could complicate his
post-operative care.

No evidence was provided to refute

plaintiff's testimony that he wouldn't have agreed to the
operation if he had known the detail of his pre-existing
kidney problems and/or that the operation itself was
experimental.

Those issues should not have been presented to

the jury.
Though the informed consent issues should not have
been presented to the jury, the trial court further compounded
its error by improperly and incorrectly instructing the jury.
The standard the trial court used was incorrect.
were also inconsistent.

(R. 154, 155)

The instructions

The first such instruction

imposes a duty to inform concerning subjects which the physician
knows or has reason to know present risks or uncertainties,
while the second limits that duty by excusing failure to inform
of known risks or uncertainties ~f the "accepted medical practice"
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would have been to withold such information.

The medical

standard of care defines what the physician should know,

b~

the legal duty to reveal that information, especially in an
elective procedure, should not be restricted or modified by
any prevailing practice of not disclosing risks, or uncertaint.
of which they are required to be aware.

The patient is

entitled to all such information and the decision to proceed
is his and his alone, not that of the doctor who does not
give a full disclosure and thereby makes that decision for
his patient.
It is a case of first impression before this court
and few courts have been confronted with informed consent in
an experimental procedure.

The proper standard in such

circumstances should be that the doctor, in failing to adviu:
the procedure and the incumbent uncertain results, should
be liable for whatever physical injury results that was
unknown at the time of the operation due to its experimental
nature.

Such is the case at bar regarding the plaintiff's

kidney failure.
Finally, the trial court committed prejudicial
error in failing to submit to the jury Plaintiff's Instructior
9, 10, and 13 defining "same or similar communities" standard
as national in scope.

The evidence in this case was that

board certified surgeons such as defendant are governed by
national boards and standards.

Therefore, the trial court

was incorrect in leaving to the jury a determination of
whether the standard was national in scope as well as what
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the standard was and whether or not the defendant breached
that standard.

In so doing, the court improperly allowed the

jury to disregard the testimony of plaintiff's two main
medical authorities simply on the basis that one of them came
from New York City and the other from San Diego, California.
That is patently contrary to the purport of the Swan case supra.
This case should be reversed and remanded for a new
trial with the issues of the statute of limitations and/or
negligent failure to obtain informed consent resolved in
plaintiff's favor as a matter of law.

In the alternative,

this matter should be remanded for a new trial with the jury
to be properly instructed on the issues.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
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day
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
On

this~day o~

::::LJ JJ--

,

1979, I mailed two

copies of the foregoing BriW:o John Snow and Elliot Williams,
counsel for defendants, 700 Continental Bank Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah

84101.
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